ABSTRACT As an extremely significant cryptographic primitive, certificateless signature (CLS) schemes can provide message authentication with no use of traditional digital certificates. High efficiency and provable security without random oracle are challenges in designing a CLS scheme. Recently, Karati et al.
I. INTRODUCTION
Certificateless signature (CLS) scheme is an extremely significant cryptographic primitive to provide message authentication. As a variant of identity-based signature (IBS), CLS scheme enables every user to generate a secret key for himself independently, in addition to the partial private key generated by the key generation center (KGC) from user's unique identifier information. CLS scheme successfully eliminates the problem of key escrow in IBS. More importantly, there is no need to certify the corresponding public key, so the public key management in CLS scheme is quite efficient. Due to above advantages, CLS scheme has received considerable attentions and become a hot topic in public key cryptography. However, many research works in the literature have failed to provide provable security in the standard model while achieving low computational cost at the same time.
Recently, Karati et al. [1] proposed a new pairing-based CLS scheme (Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme) to provide data authenticity in Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT) systems. The new scheme is quite efficient because no map-to-point (MTP) hash function is used in their construction. In order to obtain a convincing security for the new scheme, Goyal [2] and Karati and Biswas [3] proposed formal security proofs in the standard model under several hardness assumptions.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
Even though Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme is efficient and their formally security proofs are provided in the standard model,the proposed scheme is insecure under the public key replacement attack and the known message attack as shown in this paper. The public key replacement attack means that a forger can generate forged signatures on any messages without the private key of the victim. The known message attack means that a forger can generate a combined message signature pair by giving two valid signatures from a same victim. We present both attack algorithms and show that Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme for IIOT environments is not secure. Besides, we analyze the mistakes in the security proof of Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme.
B. RELATED WORK
The first concrete CLS scheme is proposed in [4] to eliminates the key-escrow problem for IBS and the formal definition of strict security for CLS schemes is considered in [5] - [7] . Since then, there have been several works on this subject. CLS may be combined with other special signatures to obtain new type of the certificateless signatures. Various schemes like certificateless signcryption [8] - [12] , certificateless aggregate signature [13] - [17] , certificateless ring signature [18] , [19] , certificateless threshold signature [20] - [22] etc. have been proposed.
Yum and Lee et al. [23] proposed a method to transfer any IBS scheme to a CLS scheme, but their constructions are vulnerable against public key replacement attack [6] . In 2006, [24] and [25] also showed the schemes in [26] and [27] are insecure against this kind of attacks. The MTP hash function and bilinear pairing are assumed to be the high computational cryptographic operations. Therefore, as an enhancement, Du and Wen [28] and He et al. [29] designed CLS schemes without MTP hash function or bilinear pairing, respectively. These constructions were good attempts to make the CLS scheme more efficient. Unfortunately, the concrete schemes in [28] and [29] were found insecure under the public key replacement attack [30] and the attack launched by a malicious KGC [31] , [32] , respectively.
In recent years, there were lots of CLS schemes without bilinear pairings [33] - [39] . However, almost all of them are only provably secure under the random oracle model (ROM) [40] . Even though ROM leads to efficient construction, it also has faced lots of criticism due to insecure guarantees in some scenarios. When ROM is implemented with a concrete hash function, the aforementioned schemes may be insecure [41] . The first concrete CLS scheme with no use of ROM was proposed by Liu et al. [42] , but was proved insecure under the attack launched by a malicious KGC by Huang and Wong [43] and Xiong et al. [44] , respectively. Then some modified schemes were put forward in [45] - [49] . But, the existing CLS schemes with no use of ROM are not secure and there are too many bilinear pairings in their concrete schemes. Therefore, constructing an efficient concrete CLS scheme provably secure against attacks with no use of ROM is still an unresolved problem.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
In Section II , we introduce preliminaries including complexity assumptions, bilinear pairing, formal definition of CLS scheme and Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme in detail. The concrete attacks on Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme, the performance analysis and the experiment results are presented in Section III . In Section IV , the security proving process of Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme is present and the mistakes in the process are pointed out. Section V provides a conclusion. 
II. PRELIMINARIES
We briefly review related concepts in Karati-IslamKaruppiah scheme in this section, including complexity assumptions, bilinear pairing, formal definition of CLS scheme. We also provide a complete description of the details of Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme to ensure this paper's integrity. As shown in Table 1 , we use the same symbols as in Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme.
A. SECURITY PROBLEMS AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
• q-Bilinear Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-BSDH) Problem. Let G 1 be a prime p ordered cyclic group with a generator g. Given (g, g θ , g (θ 2 ) , · · · , g (θ q ) ), computing a pair (e(g, g) 1 θ +r , r). Definition 1: q-BSDH assumption [2] ). Let G 1 be a prime p ordered cyclic group with a generator g. Given
If there exists no such A with non-negligible advantage within time t in solving the q-BSDH problem, then the q-BSDH assumption holds.
• q-Extended Bilinear Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-EBSDH) Problem. Let G 1 be a prime p ordered cyclic group, g be a generator of G 1 . Given a vector (g, g θ , g (θ 2 ) , · · · , g (θ q ) ), computing a pair (r, e(g, g) θ θ +r ) where r ∈ Z * p . Definition 2: q-EBSDH assumption [3] ). Let G 1 be a prime p ordered cyclic group with a generator g. Given 
C. FORMAL DEFINITION OF CLS
The formal structure of a CLS scheme considers six different algorithms as mentioned below:
• Setup(k): Generates long time master key MSK and the public parameters params.
• Set-PPK(MSK , ID i ): Returns D i to user i as the partial private key (PPK). D i can be verified at anytime.
• Set-Secret-Value(ID i ): Sends a secret value x i .
• Set-Public-Key(x i , ID i ): Generates its full public key Y i .
• CLS-Sign(SK s , m): Transmits signature σ to the verifier where SK s is the signer's private key.
• CLS-Verify(ID s , PK s , m, σ ): If the signature σ is valid, then outputs VALID, otherwise, outputs INVALID. Here PK s is the signer's public key.
D. SECURITY MODELS OF CLS
The security models of CLS can be described via the following games. A challenger C played these games with the forgers A I and A II , respectively. 1) Type-I Model:
• Setup: Challenger C generates MSK and params. It keeps MSK secret and sends params to forger A I .
• Queries: Forger A I asks the following queries adaptively. • Output: A I produces a tuple (ID , PK ID , m , σ E. KARATI-ISLAM-KARUPPIAH SCHEME Karati-Islam-Karuppiah Scheme is a concrete CLS scheme. As shown below, it includes six algorithms.
• Setup(k): KGC chooses a prime p with k bits length, p ordered cyclic group pair (G 1 , G 2 ) where g 1 is a generator of G 1 . KGC also chooses its private key
and an efficient e :
After that, KGC computes g 2 = e(g 1 , g 1 ) y and the public key Y KGC = (g 1 ) y . Finally, KGC keeps MSK = (y) safely, and publishes public parameter as params =< 
holds, D i is genuine.
• Set-Secret-Value(ID i ): Given the public parameter params, user i chooses two random numbers (x i , c i ) and sets its secret value
• Set-Public-Key(x i , ID i ): On receiving the parameter params and x i , user i sets the public key 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF KARATI-ISLAM-KARUPPIAH SCHEME
As shown in the above section, in order to design a secure concrete scheme, two types of attackers must be considered. A I models an adversary who cannot obtain the long term master key of KGC, but can replace the public keys. A II models a malicious KGC, who knows the long term master key, but cannot launch an attack through replacing users' public keys. A CLS scheme is required to satisfy existential unforgeability against both adversaries. But as shown below, we claim that Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme is insecure against either of the adversaries.
A. PUBLIC KEY REPLACEMENT ATTACK ON KARATI-ISLAM-KARUPPIAH SCHEME
First, we show A I can replace A's public key by a particular value and generate user A's signature as follows.
Attack Algorithm 1 (AA1):
KGC . Finally, A I outputs the pair σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) as forged signatures.
Given the tuple (m, ID A , σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ), Y A ), the verification algorithm of CLS scheme will work as follows:
2) Check whether (
, If it holds, the tuple is accepted as a valid signature.
Tuple (m, ID A , σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ), Y A ) can always be accepted as a valid signature.
From (1), we can derive that all tuples KGC are the generator, the public key of KGC and the result of a deterministic algorithm, respectively.
Next, we give a more generic attack in which the replacement of the public key and the valid public key are indistinguishable. They have the same probability distribution.
A I can forge user A's signature on message m by replacing A's public key to a random value.
Attack Algorithm 2 (AA2):
Finally, A I outputs the pair σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) as the forged signature.
Since
Therefore, tuple (m, ID A , σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ), Y A ) can always be accepted as a valid signature. More important, faked public key maintains the same distribution to the true public key with the help of random factor f A . An adversary can generate signatures without the victim's private key on any messages. Thus, Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme is insecure if an adversary launches these attacks as described above. 
Finally, (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is outputted as the forged signature.
The tuple (
can always pass the verification algorithm. Thus, Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme is insecure against this attack as described above. In fact, in the definitions of security models, the adversaries can launch a more powerful adaptive chosen-message attack. They can ask the challenger to answer their Sign Queries for any well-constructed messages m 1 , m 2 to make sure that the combination
is a meaningful message.
C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF TWO ATTACKS
We compare the attack algorithms in terms of signature generation time with Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme (KIK for short)in this section.
We only focus on those time consuming cryptographic operations such as exponentiation operations, modular inversion operation and multiplication operations. In order to obtain the runtime of those operations and get an accurate comparison, we choose the same curve type and security parameter length as [1] and use PBC (Pairing-Based Crypto) library [50] , which have been shown in Table 2 . The hardware environment configuration is also shown in Table 2 . We test every basic cryptographic operation 1000 times and the average runtime is shown in Table 3 .
Based on the setting in Table 2 a forged signature efficiently. The results means that in the IIoT environment using KIK, the adversaries can succeed with breaking the authentication of IIoT data with limited computation costs.
IV. THE MISTAKES IN THE SECURITY PROOF OF KARATI-ISLAM-KARUPPIAH SCHEME
These attacks can be successfully proceeded due to the weaknesses in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Karati-IslamKaruppiah scheme. At first, we concisely summarize security proofs of Karati-Islam-Karuppiah Scheme so as to make the paper consistent.
A. SECURITY PROOFS OF KARATI-ISLAM-KARUPPIAH SCHEME

Theorem 1 (Type-I Security:): If there exists a forger A I that breaks Type-I security of the Karati-Islam-Karuppiah Scheme, then there exists a solver F I that breaches q-EBSDH assumption.
Proof: Given =< G, g, g x , g x 2 , · · · , g x p >, the challenger C wants to compute the solution Z = e(g, g)
x x+θ of the q-EBSDH instance for some known θ ∈ Z * p , where G, g and q are the multiplicative group, its generator and the maximum number of queries, respectively. Suppose that there exists A I who can break the Type-I security of the CLS. 
Training phase: C responds A I 's queries as follows:
• Create User(ID i ): A I may submits a Create User query to C . C selects r i = φ(ID i ) and computes R i = g r i .
As the user's identity is public known, P(y) can be represented as q−1 j=0 (y+r j +h j ). Let, P i (y) be polynomial for ID i and it is defined for h i = H (ID i ) and coefficients
• Set-PPK(ID i ): A I asks the query on ID i and C returns
Otherwise, C calls Create User for ID i = ID * and outputs D i = (y i , R i ).
• Set-Secret-Value(ID i ): C aborts the simulation if ID i = ID * . Otherwise, C searches for
Then, C updates only x i as x i = x i and similarly for c i with c i if an entry exists for x i =⊥; otherwise, updates x i = x i , c i = c i in L after calls Create User.
• Set-Public-Value(ID i ): A I asks the query on 
• Replace-Public-Key(ID i , Y i ): Now, for invoked query
• Sign(ID i , m): A I asks the query q s = (ID i , m) and if it is not found in L , C generate the signature as defined in original scheme. Otherwise, C considers list R and proceeds as follows: -Collects the secret key pair ( Proof: Given =< G, g, g x , g x 2 , · · · , g x q >, the challenger C wants to compute the solution Z = e(g, g) 1 x+θ of the BSDH instance for some known θ ∈ Z * p where G, g and q are the multiplicative group, its generator and the maximum number of queries, respectively. Suppose that there exists A II who can break the Type-II security of the CLS. C can utilize A II to solve the hard problem by playing the interactive game with A II as following. For simplicity, the authors have considered that
Training phase:C responds A I 's queries as follows:
• Create User(ID i ): A II may submits a Create User query to C . C selects r i = φ(ID i ) and computes R i = g r i .
If
As the user's identity is public known, so P(y) = q−1 j=0 (s + h j + y). Let, P i (y) be polynomial for ID i and
for
• Set-PPK(ID i ): A II asks the query on ID i , C returns
Otherwise, C calls Create User and outputs D i = (y i , R i ).
• Set-Secret-Value(ID i ): A II asks the query on ID i , C searches for
Then, C updates only x i as x i = x i and similarly for c i with c i if an entry exists for x i =⊥; otherwise, updates x i = x i , c i = c i in L via calls Create-User.
• Set-Public-Value(ID i ): A II asks the query on ID i and C 
and Y i2 = (g 2 ) c i .
-After that, it replaces the tuple (⊥, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥) by
• Sign(ID i , m): On receiving query q s = (ID i , m) , C proceeds as follows: -Collects the secret key pair ( 
Next, the weaknesses in the security proofs of KaratiIslam-Karuppiah scheme will be pointed out. 
Therefore, A I can issue a Replace-Public-Key(ID * ) query.
In the Forgery Phase, A 1 stops asking queries and gener-
[(r i +h i )+x]x i are still used as the public key of ID * . The authors clearly forgot that A 1 may have already replaced this public key with another value. Therefore, in a sense, the public key replacement attack on the target identity was not considered in the proof of Theorem 1. 
j=0 (y + r j + h j ). We can derive that if and only if c = 0, the equation can be established.
Thus, at the end of game 1, the factor 1 c being used to compute ϒ is meaningless. C cannot compute ϒ via
q-EBSDH problem was not really solved in the proof. 
δ as a solution. In this process, C only used the public key Y ID = (Y ID 1 , Y ID 2 ) associated with the target identity ID * . σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) generated by A II was not used at all. No matter what the signature is, C could continues the above process. Therefore, in a sense, C solved the q-BSDH problem without the help of A II . In another word, the ability of A II was not reduced to solving the hard problem in the proof of Theorem 2.
2) WEAKNESS 2: Q-BSDH PROBLEM WAS NOT REALLY SOLVED IN THE PROOF
The proof of Theorem 2 also has mistake in solving the hard problem. In the Training Phase, to answer the A II 's Create user oracle, C reforms the polynomial P(y) as P(y) =
In the Forgery Phase, C expands the same polynomial P(y)
We can derive that if and only if c = 0, the equation can be established.
Thus, at the end of game 2, the factor 1 δ being used to compute ϒ is meaningless. C cannot compute ϒ via
q-BSDH problem was not really solved in the proof. Therefore, due to the existence of these mistakes as mentioned above, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 of Karati-IslamKaruppiah scheme are invalid in terms of security.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Karati-Islam-Karuppiah scheme is quite efficient because no MTP hash function was used in the concrete construction. Karati et al. also gave formal security proofs without random oracles. However, as shown in this paper, Karati-IslamKaruppiah scheme cannot defend the public key replacement attack and the known message attack. The adversary can generate forged signatures without knowing the victim's private key. In addition, the weaknesses in the proof process lead to a failure of provable security. In summary, Karati-IslamKaruppiah scheme cannot be used in IIoT systems to provide authenticity since anybody can generate signatures on the data on behalf of the IIoT data owner without being detected. Furthermore, any communication protocol constructed based on this scheme is not secure and cannot resist various forms of attack, such as counterfeit attack, man-in-the-middle attack and so on [51] . 
